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There is a push in psychology toward more transparent practices, stemming partially as a 
response to the replication crisis. We argue that the psychology of religion should help lead the 
way toward these new, more transparent practices to ensure a robust and dynamic subfield. One 
of the major issues that proponents of Open Science practices hope to address is researcher 
degrees of freedom (RDF). We pre-registered and conducted a systematic review of the 2017 
issues from three psychology of religion journals. We aimed to identify the extent to which the 
psychology of religion has embraced Open Science practices and the role of RDF within the 
subfield. We found that many of the methodologies that help to increase transparency, such as 
pre-registration, have yet to be adopted by those in the subfield. In light of these findings, we 
present recommendations for addressing the issue of transparency in the psychology of religion 
and outline how to move toward these new Open Science practices. 
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Nelson, Simmons, and Simonsohn (2018) described the field of psychology as being in a 
reformation period after a “replication crisis”. This crisis is defined by many research methods, 
findings, and publication practices being recognised as less robust than originally perceived. For 
example, contemporary research is often underpowered (Button, Ioannidis, & Mokrysz, 2013), 
despite repeated warnings about low sample sizes (Cohen, 1962; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989). 
Journals publish articles with low-quality control; up to 50% of published articles contain a 
statistical reporting error (Brown & Heathers, 2017; Nuijten, Hartgerink, & van Assen, 2016). 
Many studies originally seen to be robust cannot be replicated, even with larger sample sizes 
(e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Wagenmakers et al., 2016). Finally, publication bias 
appears to be particularly prevalent in psychology as results almost always favour a researcher’s 
hypothesis (Fanelli, 2010). The reformation movement in psychology, part of the broader Open 
Science movement, is focused on mitigating these issues. Special issues presenting solutions to 
these problems for psychology, both as a whole and within specific sub-fields, have proliferated 
(e.g., Asarnow et al., 2018; Kappenman & Keil, 2017; Rouse, 2018). Here, we focus on one part 
of this reformation: researcher degrees of freedom. 
Researcher degrees of freedom (RDF) are the numerous choices made in the process of 
conducting research. These choices are often arbitrary and can influence the outcome of 
significance testing. This, in turn, can push the conclusions into different directions, depending 
on the decisions that the researcher made (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Wicherts et 
al., 2016). This is why RDF is an issue: the opportunistic use of this flexibility to tweak data, 
especially when undocumented in manuscripts and thus without transparency, is ethically 




exclusion criteria, which measures to report, cut-off points for comparison groups, what 
covariates to include, and how to calculate outcome variables. Roettger (2018) provides a 
comprehensive overview of how RDF appear throughout the research timeline and reports a 
simulation that demonstrates how RDF dramatically increase the false positive rate.  
Flexibility in performing data analyses is problematic (Lane et al., 2016), especially when 
combined with publication bias (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012). In an exaggerated 
example, Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011) showed how undisclosed flexibility in 
analytic decision making can lead to nonsensical but statistically significant results. In a real 
study, participants listening to the Beatles’ song “When I’m Sixty-Four” were found to be a year 
and a half younger than those who listened to “Kalimba”. However, this finding only appeared 
after dropping an additional condition, including participants’ fathers’ age as a covariate, and 
because they repeatedly analysed their data while collecting data until they found a significant 
effect. This process is known as “p-hacking”, i.e. iterating on an analysis until the result is 
statistically significant (Head et al., 2015). This procedure is not necessarily nefarious. For 
example, checking for outliers or covariates is often advisable, but if this process is not outlined 
before checking the data, then post-hoc rationalisations can be used for determining which 
definition of ‘outlier’ to use. In this example, many definitions of ‘outlier’ would make sense, 
and so one that changes a non-significant result into a significant result may be chosen based on 
seemingly valid reasoning to all those involved. We believe that this is an inevitable result of a 
lack of pre-defined controls over the flexibility in analytic decision making. Indeed, most 
researchers do not recognize most of these behaviors as questionable (John, Loewenstein, & 




The example in Simmons et al. (2011) is exaggerated, but the innocuous nature of 
flexibility in data analysis can be seen in a more realistic example. Twenty-nine teams of 
analysts answered the same research question using the same dataset (Silberzahn et al., 2018). 
Out of the 29 teams, 20 found a significant result. Combined, the teams used 21 unique 
combinations of covariates. This supports Gelman and Loken’s (2013) “garden of forking paths”, 
the variation and flexibility permitted by a complex dataset. This flexibility is often rationalized 
as making sense of data on the path to answering a research question. If the procedures are fully 
transparent there is no problem with repeatedly analyzing data. However, these results should be 
specifically labelled as exploratory (de Groot, 1954/2014). 
We argue that RDF are not a problem themselves, but become problematic when there is 
a lack of transparency surrounding researchers’ decisions and their rationale for making them. 
Undisclosed flexibility in RDF, (also dubbed the opportunistic use of RDF; Wicherts et al., 
2016), should be viewed as a cognitive bias with steps put into place to mitigate its effect. 
Fortunately, we have reached a point in the reformation where various authors have written 
practical suggestions for change (Nelson et al., 2018), and we can focus on the solutions 
presented to minimize this bias in the future. 
One suggestion to control the opportunistic use of RDF is using a pre-registered analysis 
plan (van‘t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016) or a registered report (Chambers, 2013; Chambers, 
Feredoes, Muthukumaraswamy, & Etchells, 2014; Nosek & Lakens, 2014). Pre-registration is a 
process where researchers outline their hypotheses, data collection methods, measures, and 
analyses in advance via an online repository. A registered report is the logical extension of this: 
the introduction and methods sections are written in advance and submitted to a journal as a 




evaluate the stage-one paper and decide whether or not to provide in-principle acceptance based 
on the research question and quality of the authors’ proposed methods. If so, the final manuscript 
will be published regardless of whether the researcher’s hypotheses were supported, providing 
the final methods were consistent with the stage-one submission. After data collection, analysis, 
and write-up, the paper is then submitted as a stage-two manuscript for a second round of peer 
review. Editors and reviewers check that the authors adhered to their proposed methods, 
provided sound justification for any deviations, and that the overall quality of the write-up meets 
the standards of the journal. So long as the methods remained consistent, or changes in the 
analytical plan were validly justified between stage one and stage two, this second stage of 
review is meant to refine the paper for publication more than to act as a gatekeeping stage. The 
provisional acceptance of a paper prior to data collection removes problems related to RDF and 
publication bias. 
A selection of RDF that pre-registration can cover are: sample size justification, outlier 
removal, data analysis plans, materials/scales, and specifying hypotheses. Failing to control for 
these RDF increases the false positive rate and reduces the reliability of published literature. It is 
important to have a clear a priori plan for how many participants will be included, as repeatedly 
analyzing data during data collection increases the false positive rate (Simmons et al., 2011). 
Using an opportunistic combination of data preprocessing techniques, including outlier removal, 
increases the false positive rate (Morís Fernández & Vadillo, 2019). In addition, when authors 
perform significance tests the alpha level is normally set to 0.05 for an individual test. However, 
when multiple tests are performed, the experimentwise error rate is the alpha level multiplied by 
the number of tests performed. Not controlling for multiple tests, thus modifying the alpha, 




increase the rate of false positives, we believe that they are particularly important to constrain 
during pre-registration.      
Why the Field of Psychology of Religion?  
The psychology of religion has frequently been criticized due to the inevitability of 
researchers’ predispositions toward the subject matter biasing their research (Ladd & Messick, 
2016; Messick & Farias, 2019; Wulff, 1998). In addition, researchers have argued that the field 
has potentially been slanted in a pro-religious direction due to religiously-motivated 
organizations funding a substantial amount of the field’s research (Ambasciano & Coleman, 
2019; Bains, 2011; Wulff, 2003). However, these issues may be less widespread today than they 
once were. Still, the field has far from removed itself from the shadows of the past. The field is 
disproportionately composed of individuals who are themselves religious, which often puts those 
individuals at odds with the wider scientific community. The psychology of religion has, 
throughout its history, struggled to thrive due to the hostility in which many scientists outside of 
the field approach religion (Wulff, 1998).  
Another area of contention within the field is the lack of consistency in terminology. 
Categories such as ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’ are polysemantic and resist straightforward 
definition. This results in constructs, operationalizations, and measurement scales that can vary 
widely in meaning and the terminology used to describe them (Coleman & Jong, in press). In 
part, this reflects the challenges associated with defining and measuring all sociocultural 
phenomena (Coleman & Hood, 2015; de Jager Meezenbroek et al., 2012; Moberg, 2002; Slater, 
Hall, & Edwards, 2001). However, utilizing Open Science practices to increase transparency of 
RDF when studying religion and spirituality is especially important due to the amorphous nature 




Although the use of pre-registration and registered reports has increased across 
psychology (Nosek & Lindsay, 2018), we have anecdotally noticed that these meta-methods 
appear less frequently in the psychology of religion (Uzdavines, Hill, Coleman, Gibson, & 
Stauner, 2017). To investigate this observation, we conducted a systematic review of articles 
published in three major psychology of religion journals to audit the uptake of Open Science 
methods. We audited across all issues of three psychology of religion journals from 2017. We 
reasoned that by 2017 enough time had passed since the major events triggering the replication 
crisis and discussion of reform between 2011 and 2015 for uptake of Open Science methods to 
begin within the psychology of religion (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons et al., 
2011). Our hypothesis is that the recommendations for reform have not penetrated the 
psychology of religion. We believe that if we find very few articles transparently mitigating 
researcher degrees of freedom, we are justified in proposing how the psychology of religion can 
embrace Open Science practices.  
We present: (1) a systematic review of psychology of religion literature to understand the 
extent of RDF and (2) ways that researchers within psychology of religion can control for RDF 
by using Open Science practices. We hope these recommendations will strengthen our discipline 
and further standardize how we propose and report research, increasing trust of the field among 
outsiders beyond the psychology of religion. 
Methods 
We pre-registered the protocol for this systematic review on the Open Science 
Framework (OSF; https://osf.io/fs67k/?view_only=e19600c738d247ff926c0d5e9378c6f0). This 
included our hypothesis, eligibility criteria, and review process. Any omissions or deviations 




hypothesis was not operationalized. We were looking at various possible RDF to find what can 
be learned from the sampling frame as a basis to make recommendations to others in the field. 
Sampling Frame  
In an effort to capture a broad perspective on the state of the psychology of religion, we 
reviewed all of the articles published in the 2017 issues of three major journals: Archive for the 
Psychology of Religion (APR), International Journal for the Psychology of Religion (IJPR), and 
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality (PRS). These three journals represent the most widely 
read psychology of religion journals focusing purely on psychology and religion, without other 
sub-field specialization. Other journals that we considered, but discounted, were ‘Mental Health, 
Religion, and Culture’, ‘Journal of Religion and Health’, ‘Journal of Psychology and Theology’ 
and ‘Journal of Psychology and Christianity’. We dismissed them for focusing on theological 
matters, social anthropology, or Christianity rather than being generally representative of the 
field.  
For inclusion, an article had to be (1) empirical, (2) include quantitative methods in at 
least one part of the article , and (3) published in the year 2017. Despite growing interest in Open 
Science practices in qualitative research (Tamminen & Poucher, 2018), our review and 
subsequent recommendations focus on quantitative methods. Before applying our exclusion 
criteria, the sampling frame consisted of 14 (APR), 21 (IJPR), and 45 (PRS) articles. The final 
sample included 8, 14, and 31 articles respectively. 
Data Extraction  
The primary outcome we coded for was the proportion of papers that reported constraints 
on RDF. Constraints were based on the pre-registration checklist by Wicherts et al. (2016). This 




RDF constraints that would be most easily observed. Our codes included: whether the study was 
pre-registered, whether sample size was justified a priori (e.g., through power analysis), and 
whether any measures were modified without validation, also known as a questionable 
measurement practice (Flake, Pek, & Hehman, 2017). Most categories were coded using a 
dichotomous present or not present rating with additional options available for when a code was 
not applicable to the article or when the presence of a category was unclear. When the two 
coders compared results and discussed any discrepancies, we determined that some of our initial 
codes were too interpretative and dropped them to focus on RDF less prone to differences in 
interpretation. For example, our original coding scheme included whether the definition of a 
construct was consistent with the measure the author used. This is highlighted as a deviation 
from our pre-registered coding scheme, as the data were recorded and are available on the OSF, 
but are not included in the final manuscript. As a result, we did not code for some data analysis 
RDF highlighted in Wicherts et al.’s checklist, including justifications for correcting or 
discarding data, dealing  with assumption violations, and outlier removal. We also did not code 
for certain specialized statistical RDF. The full coding scheme is available on the OSF 
(https://osf.io/yd7k9/?view_only=e19600c738d247ff926c0d5e9378c6f0). 
Two of the authors (KJM and TJC-III) independently completed our coding scheme 
before comparing results. SJC compared the results and calculated the interrater reliability. We 
used Gwet’s AC1 (Gwet, 2008) instead of the commonly used Kappa coefficient as its statistical 
properties are more favourable. AC1 provides a less biased estimate of the ‘true’ interrater 
reliability (Gwet, 2008) and avoids underestimating interrater reliability when there is an 
imbalance in the marginal totals of the table (Wongpakaran et al., 2013). We decided to use a 




Bajpai, & Chaturvedi, 2015, p. 26). If the value was below .80, SJC provided her input and the 
group came to a final agreement. If the value was .80 or above, a discussion was held between 
KJM and TJC-III to discuss which categories the differences fell within with SJC moderating the 
discussion. 
Results 
Inter-Rater Reliability  
Once both KJM and TJC-III completed their coding independently, SJC calculated interrater 
reliability for each of the 15 measures that were relevant to RDF in the psychology of religion 
(see Table 1). The raw data and R (R Core Studio, 2017) script are available on the OSF 
(https://osf.io/b6n8t/?view_only=7585611b8ffa4fe387abe8caca278cc4). Due to the low level of 
agreement across multiple measures, SJC provided input to help the group come to a consensus. 
We acknowledge here that what constituted a ‘low level of agreement’ was not defined in the 
pre-registration. We used the .80 value for AC1 that Bajpai, Bajpai, and Chaturvedi (2015) 
provide due to its general acceptance. We added this comment to increase the transparency of 
our own RDF, as a guide to others on how to include such comments in their own work.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Systematic Review - Overview 
Of the 80 journal articles across the three journals of interest, 27 papers did not meet our 
inclusion criteria due to being review papers, purely qualitative papers, or theoretical papers. We 
included 53 papers for full coding. The completed coding scheme is available on the OSF 
(https://osf.io/mj7sp/?view_only=2612658d15d14c84a559a082d847b488). In addition, see Table 
2 for a summary of codes and percentages of papers matching each code following consensus. 




No researchers included a pre-registration with their studies, although two authors did 
mention that they should have done so and would seek to do so in the future. 
RDF in Defining and Rationalizing Measures 
Definitions of variables should always clearly match up with the operationalization of 
those variables. A discrepancy between the definition of a construct and how it is operationalized 
into a measure causes problems with the validity of the data and analytical claims. This is 
especially true in the psychology of religion, where abstract concepts like religion and 
spirituality are regularly studied. Not only are these concepts difficult to define, they are difficult 
to measure. We identified inconsistencies between how R/S constructs were defined and how 
they were measured in instances where either the definition was vague or non-existent. We also 
identified cases where a definition is clearly addressing a different aspect of spirituality or 
religion than what the scale was measuring. Of the included papers, 45 (85%) provided 
definitions for all their Religious/Spirituality (RS) measures and one (2%) had no RS measures. 
The remaining seven (13%) used RS terminology, but did not provide a definition for all RS 
measures. For the clarity of these definitions, we coded six (11%) for using only vague 
definitions for their RS measure(s). Three (6%) papers used more than one RS measure with a 
mix of vague/undefined and clear definitions. Thirty-nine (73%) of the papers included a clear 
definition for all of their RS measure(s). Four (8%) papers were among those that did not define 
their RS measures. One article (2%) had no RS measures at all.  
We also coded for whether or not the RS measures authors used matched the definitions 
of the RS variables they described measuring. We coded two (4%) papers as having non-
matching RS measure definitions, 40 (75%) had matching definitions for all their RS measures, 




measures, and one (2%) paper had no RS measures at all. Notably, however, our interrater 
agreement was very low. This result should be interpreted with caution. Some of our difficulty 
with agreement within this area stems from difficulty picking apart RDF from issues of validity 
in measurement selection. 
For rationales behind the RS measure(s) used, 50 papers (94%) provided a full rationale 
for the authors’ decision while three (6%) included partial rationales. The authors of four (8%) 
papers created their own measures. In papers that used previously published RS measures, three 
(6%) modified all of their measures in some way, 14 (26%) modified at least one measure, and 
32 (60%) did not modify their measures. Of the 17 papers that modified their measures in some 
way, all provided an explanation for cut-offs for these scales, where applicable. Only three did 
not provide a rationale for modifying the measure. However, we had very low levels of 
agreement regarding this criteria and these results should be interpreted cautiously. 
RDF in Statistical Analysis 
We coded for 1) if a study was exploratory or confirmatory, 2) if there was a rationale for 
the sample size, and 3) to what extent Type I and Type II errors were accounted for to explore 
the use of RDF in statistical analysis. The research approach of 19 (36%) papers was exploratory 
in nature, while 25 papers (47%) used a confirmatory approach. Exploratory studies were 
defined as testing a non-directional hypothesis, while confirmatory studies were defined as 
testing a directional hypothesis. The remaining nine (17%) mixed exploratory and confirmatory 
analyses. Twelve (23%) papers provided a rationale for sample size, but only two of these used 
an a priori power analysis. The remaining 41 (77%) articles did not include any justification for 
their sample sizes. For Type I and Type II error correction, four (8%) papers corrected for Type I 




I errors. One (2%) paper explained why they did not include any corrections. Type I error 
correction was not applicable in the remaining five (9%) papers (e.g., if only one test was 
conducted). 
 
RDF in Reporting Results 
There are a number of ways RDF can appear in how authors report their results. We 
coded for whether or not authors provided exact p-values or reported non-significant results as 
trending or marginally significant to guide the narrative in a direction that still supports the 
author's claims. During our initial coding, we found that 25 (47%) of the 53 papers included in 
our analysis gave exact p-values throughout the text of the paper. However, we then decided to 
include tables in our coding scheme. Of the 25 papers we initially coded as providing exact p-
values throughout the text, nine (17%) of these followed the correlation table convention of 
using an asterisk to mark gradations of p-value (e.g., * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01) 
instead of providing exact p-values in their tables. After deliberation between coders, we decided 
that this variation in reporting p-values between text and tables qualified as not providing exact 
p-values throughout the entirety of the paper. We acknowledge this was not included in our pre-
registration as we did not anticipate this scenario. Thus after our final coding, only 16 (30%) 
papers provided exact values for every p-value, 20 (38%) did not provide exact p-values and 16 
(30%) papers varied in whether, and how, they reported exact p-values throughout their results 
sections. This was not applicable for one (2%) of the papers as it only included descriptive 
statistics.   
We also coded for the presence of RDF related to reporting non-significant results as 




in a way that implied the authors’ believed them to be “almost-significant”. We found that nine 
(17%) papers considered non-significant results “marginally” significant and/or considered 
results above the authors’ alpha value, usually of p < .05, as significant in some way. The 
remainder (83%) did not do so. Of the nine papers, five (9%) over-inflated their results in their 
discussion/conclusion sections (e.g., making a “marginally significant” effect one of the key 
findings of the article). The remaining articles (91%) did not over-inflate their results. While 
other psychology disciplines found higher rates for reporting .05 < p < .10 as “marginally” 
significant, 30.1% in clinical psychology and 45.4% organizational psychology (Olsson-
Collentine, van Assen, & Hartgerink, 2019), the rate in our sampling frame is still higher than 
ideal.  
Discussion 
In this systematic review, we investigated the transparency of RDF within the psychology 
of religion. We did this after noticing, anecdotally, that the signs of movement toward using 
Open Science practices seen in other parts of the psychological sciences had yet to appear within 
the field (Uzdavines et al., 2017). We conducted a systematic review of all papers published by 
three major psychology of religion journals in 2017. After completing the review, we found 
many instances where RDF could have been better controlled or accounted for, demonstrating a 
lack of transparency in the use of RDF and making it difficult to know exactly what process was 
followed by the authors of the published studies. As such, we believe that making 
recommendations regarding how the psychology of religion can better handle and report RDF is 
warranted.  




Papers with unaccounted for RDF were spread across all three journals. This suggests 
that these practices exist across the psychology of religion, as opposed to being journal-specific, 
and that there is a problem with transparency in the use of RDF throughout the discipline. 
Our  review demonstrated the lack of adoption of pre-registration, as we found no pre-registered 
articles. This means we cannot know to what extent researchers changed their hypotheses after 
data analysis. Comparatively, 19 articles were pre-registered in the journal Psychological 
Science alone in the year 2017 (Nosek & Lindsay, 2018). Given five years have passed since 
psychological research methods and practices first received scrutiny for increasing RDF (see, 
Nelson et al., 2018 for a brief history), it is surprising that no articles were pre-registered in any 
of the three psychology of religion journals. Between the beginning of the reformation and the 
2017 articles, many calls moving to pre-registration have been made in social and psychological 
sciences (e.g., Bakker et al., 2012; Miguel et al., 2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2012).  
We also found a lack of Type I error correction, or even the mention of it, within many of 
the articles within our sampling frame. These omissions bring the reliability of results presented 
in these articles into question. Significant findings might be an artifact of a lack of correction for 
multiple tests rather than true effects. As previously discussed, it is unlikely that any of these 
authors omitted Type I error correction intentionally, rather this is an example of unaccounted 
RDF.  
Another issue is the lack of sample size justification within most of the sampling frame, 
which may have led to underpowered studies. Only 12 of 53 (23%) articles provided any 
justification for the sample sizes used in their research and only two (4%) of these studies 
reported a power analysis. Similar audits of sample size calculations have been performed in 




articles (Larson & Carbine, 2017) and only a single study reporting one in fMRI research (Guo et 
al., 2014). Researchers often use rules of thumb to determine their sample size and consistently 
overestimate the statistical power provided by their samples (Bakker, Hartgerink, Wicherts, & 
van der Maas, 2016). This review suggests that research within the psychology of religion is still 
conducted without statistical power in mind, despite repeated warnings of the implications of 
underpowered studies (Cohen, 1962; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989; Button et al., 2013). This is 
a double-barrelled issue, as the effect of the opportunistic use of RDF is more severe in 
underpowered studies (Bakker et al., 2012). Moreover, we cannot know something that is not 
included in a paper. As such, if authors are not being transparent about RDF, we cannot know 
about the unstated actions or intentions of the author. This extends to sample sizes. Without a 
clearly justified sample size, it becomes more difficult to evaluate whether or not researchers 
engaged in data peeking, a sub-type of p-hacking. 
Finally, we coded for the presence of confirmatory and/or exploratory research but few 
papers made this distinction explicit. We coded for this in order to help better contextualize the 
presentation of the results of the papers in our sampling frame. The interpretation of results can 
be skewed by whether or not research is exploratory or confirmatory in nature. When research is 
exploratory, the results should be interpreted as a basis for new ideas, hypotheses and further 
research. On its own, exploratory research has less evidential value (de Groot, 1954/2014). For 
confirmatory research, a specific hypothesis should be tested in a clear way with an a priori 
analytical plan (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). However, the line between exploratory and 
confirmatory research is often blurred in psychological research, with the majority of 




research are achieved through a cycle of exploratory and confirmatory research, but it is crucial 
that the distinction between the two is explicit. 
Practical Recommendations  
Based on the results of our systematic review and other articles on reducing RDF (e.g., 
Wicherts et al., 2016), we believe these recommendations will help improve the level of 
transparency surrounding RDF and the quality of research in the psychology of religion. 
Journal article policy. One reason for the lack of pre-registered articles found in this 
review could be that those who did pre-register their studies published somewhere that provides 
an incentive for doing so. As of the beginning of 2017, none of the journals within our sampling 
frame actively promoted Open Science practices. Commonly raised challenges for adopting 
Open Science practices among researchers include a lack of incentive and/or opportunity from 
the gatekeepers of scientific publishing such as journal and grant funding bodies (Allen & 
Mehler, 2018; Munafò et al., 2017). If Open Science practices have a steep learning curve, but 
are not part of the journal submission guidelines or if the journal researchers want to publish in 
does not accept registered reports, why would authors commit to them? Therefore, it is important 
for journals to encourage and facilitate the adoption of Open Science practices. Laudably, there 
have been recent developments in this area. In December 2017, the IJPR began to offer badges 
for publications demonstrating Open Science practices (Elk, Rowatt, & Streib, 2017). In June 
2018, the APR began offering Open Science badges and accepting submissions of registered 
reports. Open Science publication badges are like scout patches and indicate that the article 
includes Open Science practices such as pre-registering the study’s hypotheses and methodology 




published article. This is an attempt to incentivize Open Science practices as the badges signal 
more transparent and robust research practices.  
Offering badges has been shown to improve the adoption of Open Science practices 
(Kidwell et al., 2016; Rowhani-Farid, Allen, & Barnett, 2017). Badges may offer journals’ 
editorial boards a relatively simple and low-cost solution to improve submissions. Ultimately, 
publishing is important for the careers of scientists and journals are the gatekeepers of science 
that control what research is published. For randomised controlled trials, there is evidence that 
journals endorsing reporting guidelines have higher article quality (Turner, Shamseer, Altman, 
Schulz, & Moher, 2012). Consequently, if all psychology of religion journals endorse reporting 
guidelines which are designed for the social and behavioural sciences, such as the TOP 
guidelines (TOP Guidelines Committee, 2016; the IJPR is already a signatory), the reporting 
quality and evidentiary value of our research should increase. Hopefully, all journals in the 
psychology of religion can offer badges and registered reports, helping to lead the way in 
promoting Open Science practices. An editorial published, after our analyses had been 
performed, in the APR outlined a new vision for the journal with an emphasis on transparency 
and utilizing registered reports (Ladd, 2019).    
Pre-registration. Regardless of journals adopting badges or registered reports, 
researchers can begin making RDF in research more transparent by pre-registering their studies. 
Over time, this will help pre-registration become a new norm in the psychology of religion. Pre-
registering design features such as the primary outcome and sample size has been mandatory for 
clinical trials since 2005 in an effort to reduce publication bias and outcome switching 
(Viergever & Li, 2015). In addition, pre-registering hypotheses and analytical plans would create 




reduce the over-inflation of conclusions made from exploratory results. It would also allow for 
more robust conclusions to be drawn for pre-registered confirmatory experiments, further 
increasing transparency and certainty in the authors’ findings. During the replication crisis, pre-
registration was proposed as an initiative for psychological research and has since seen a large 
uptake with over 8,000 pre-registrations being recorded on the OSF alone as of March 2018 
(Nosek et al., 2018). Adopting this practice into the psychology of religion would help 
modernize the field, allowing both researchers across disciplines and the general public to put 
greater trust in the field’s research.  
Addressing concerns about pre-registration. We are aware that there may be 
reservations from some researchers who worry pre-registration may limit their research in some 
way or could be difficult to implement. We will briefly outline and address some of these 
concerns to provide a better understanding of the pre-registration process, which we hope will 
increase adoption of the practice.  
One of the first concerns broached by researchers learning about pre-registration is that, 
by registering their analytical plan in advance, they are restricting their ability to explore issues 
they had not considered prior to data collection. While this concern is understandable given the 
appearance of rigidity that pre-registration brings with it, it is important to note that changes 
from a pre-registration are allowed and common (for a good example of how this can be done 
transparently, see Skinner et al., 2017). So long as both the modifications and justifications for 
them are described in the final paper, changes to the analytical plan or including additional 
research questions are well within the accepted scope of pre-registered articles. Importantly, this 




published work can contain a mix of confirmatory and exploratory analyses without authors’ 
creativity being stunted. 
A second common concern is that the pre-registration process itself may be difficult to 
learn and that researchers who do not have experience with pre-registration may not do it 
correctly. This concern can be broken into two parts: (1) learning and using new methodologies 
comes with an increased risk of making errors, which no researcher wants in their papers and (2) 
making these errors may cause authors more issues in getting published than not pre-registering 
their study at all. While we understand researchers’ trepidation to adopt the practice, there are 
guides and primers on how to efficiently conduct a pre-registration (see, Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2017; van’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; http://help.osf.io/m/registrations). Taking 
the pragmatic approach and gradually adopting more Open Science practices to incrementally 
increase the level of transparency in your research is still better than not adopting any at all 
(Klein et al., 2018; Nuijten, 2019). Use of any Open Science practice should be commended on 
making steps in the right direction, not condemned for not going further. 
A third concern often raised by researchers is that pre-registration could waste valuable 
time better spent on research itself. It may be the case that the design phase of the study takes 
longer when it is carefully pre-registered (Allen & Mehler, 2018). However, we argue that the 
time taken to pre-register work ahead of data collection is a time-saving measure in the long run, 
not a time-cost. Given that, anecdotally, substantial delays between data collection and analysis 
in large projects are common, thorough documentation would likely help many in the field 
resume projects more swiftly. In particular, when an analysis plan has been pre-registered, 
researchers can conduct data analysis at a much faster rate relative to first needing to re-invent 




It is also important to highlight what pre-registration cannot solve. For example, 
individual authors can still use measures which have issues with validity or flexibly report their 
outcomes and procedures. One such issue can be highlighted by the pre-registration of this 
article. We pre-registered our hypothesis - that adoption of Open Science methods would be 
‘rare’. Using the term ‘rare’ without providing a specific rate or quantity is an example of 
providing a non-operationalized hypothesis. This cannot be addressed by pre-registration itself, 
but requires authors to clearly operationalise their hypotheses. Moreover, in clinical trials where 
study registrations have a longer history and are a formal requirement, outcome measures can 
still be switched or misrepresented (Goldacre et al., 2019). There is, ultimately, nothing stopping 
researchers from emphasizing a secondary outcome or dropping a condition. Thankfully, pre-
registering the study makes this visible, whereas without pre-registration, this process may 
remain undetected.  
Relatedly, a second limitation is the question of who takes on the burden of comparing 
the pre-registration protocol and the final paper. One answer is that the peer reviewers should 
appraise the consistency of the final paper with the pre-registration protocol when it is submitted 
for publication. While this has been raised as an additional burden on the voluntary services of 
the peer reviewer, we believe that, together with the journal editor, they are best-suited as 
gatekeepers to what is published. Editors and reviewers hold the power to ensure the article is 
published as faithfully to the pre-registration protocol as possible and that any deviations are 
transparently addressed. We benefited from this scrutiny, as one helpful reviewer closely 





Registered reports. One solution to many of the above limitations is conducting and 
publishing a study following the registered report format. This way, the introduction and 
methods are submitted to the journal and peer-reviewed before data are collected. When the final 
article is submitted, the peer reviewers can identify if the study has been faithful to the stage-one 
submission. The study would only be published if it is consistent and the task of checking the 
consistency of the final article with the stage one submission is built into the publication process. 
This removes the problem of responsibility for self-archiving a pre-registration protocol. 
Nevertheless, there are still common misconceptions and perceived barriers, but these have been 
addressed elsewhere (see, Chambers et al., 2014). Pre-registration and/or registered reports 
would help to mitigate a large number of RDF. 
Sample size justification. Justifying a sample size is an important practice that can be 
included in a pre-registration protocol. We found that 41 of 53 (77%) papers did not provide a 
justification for their sample size. Of the remaining 12, only two reported an a priori power 
analysis. Experiments with fewer participants than required for the predicted effect size are 
considered underpowered. Researchers often neglect justifying their sample size, which provides 
some insight into why contemporary research is commonly underpowered (Button et al., 2013). 
This is a major concern, because low statistical power means the results may not be replicable. 
Take the Open Science Collaboration (2015) as an example. They failed to replicate the original 
effects in over 60% of their replication studies. One explanation is that, because the original 
studies were underpowered, the replicating studies based their power analyses on inflated effect 
sizes. Inflated effect sizes cause power analysis calculations to be skewed, meaning they have 
less power to detect smaller, more realistic, effect sizes (Etz & Vanderkerckhove, 2016; Morey 




registered studies (Schäfer & Schwarz, 2019), suggests that non-registered studies may provide 
slightly inflated results. A key strength of science is that it is a cumulative process, thus it is 
critically important to perform both well-powered original and replication studies. 
Specifically, our next recommendation is for future research to be designed with 
statistical power in mind. There are currently many tools available online (mostly free) that allow 
researchers to conduct power analyses. For example, the ‘pwr’ R package (Champely, 2018) is a 
free, open-source implementation to conduct power analyses in R. For those not familiar with the 
R coding language, G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) is a free application dedicated to providing 
sample size and power calculations for many research designs. In addition, 
www.powerandsamplesize.com (HyLown Consulting LLC, 2018) is a website where sample size 
and power can be calculated online. Alternatively, sequential analysis allows for interim analyses 
to be conducted with error corrections in place to prevent an increase in false-positive rate 
(Lakens, 2014). These tools make the design of well-powered experiments easy and efficient. As 
researchers use these tools more frequently, this should increase the number of well-powered 
studies, thus permitting further trust in psychological research on religion and increasing the 
transparency of RDF in the field. 
Type I error correction. Having a well-powered study allows for researchers to be sure 
that they are likely to find an effect where there is one (to avoid a false negative). However, false 
positives should also be avoided. Whether or not a study uses a correction method to account for 
false positives is an often overlooked form of RDF. To help reduce these RDF, data analyses 
should include some form of Type I error correction, such as the Bonferroni correction (Bland & 
Altman, 1995), or False Discovery Rate correction (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). This also 




2016). In our review, 43 of 48 (90%) of the papers where Type I error correction could have 
been applicable did not state whether a correction was performed. While this issue affects other 
fields as well (see, Lachlan & Spence, 2005), the decision not to mention accounting for Type I 
error correction in any way in such a large proportion of papers demonstrates low levels of 
transparency within the psychology of religion. Consequently, we recommend that future 
researchers include whether or not their results are corrected for Type I error. A rationale for 
(not) applying a correction should also be provided.  
Limitations 
There are several limitations to our systematic review. As we coded for the presence or 
absence of RDF based on what was reported in the paper, we cannot definitively rule out that 
decisions such as sample size justification were outlined a priori. However, this means 
researchers can improve their reporting of important study design details by including this 
information. Secondly, we based our coding scheme on the pre-registration checklist by Wicherts 
et al. (2016) which is designed to be used throughout the process of a study. Our team selected 
items that we thought could be observable in published articles. In hindsight, our coding scheme 
could have been better. Some of our criteria were unfocused and open to interpretation, such as 
whether authors modified measures without theoretical justification or validation. This may have 
led to our low inter-rater reliability. As outlined in the pre-registration protocol, any 
disagreements were rectified by SJC and group consensus. Because SJC erred on the side of 
coding an ambiguous article as more transparent, these findings may also represent an optimistic 
estimate of the prevalence of RDF within psychology of religion. As demonstrated by our 
attempt at documenting RDF, they are an elusive assortment of problems that are difficult to 




been more comprehensive; we overlooked important RDF such as justifying outlier removal 
techniques and the specificity and directionality of hypotheses. Since most RDF will not be 
mentioned within the context of a research paper, it is unlikely that any study could show the 
“true” prevalence of RDF. Therefore, our results may underestimate the extent and diversity of 
RDF. Future studies could explore the use of RDF in the formative stages of research, then 
follow their use throughout the research process (also see, Latour & Woolgar, 1979/2013) to get 
a better grasp on when and where RDF occur that might not be reported in the context of 
published articles, or when authors think about their use of RDF retrospectively.     
Conclusion 
We propose three main recommendations for researchers that we believe will improve 
research within the psychology of religion: (1) research hypotheses and analysis plans should be 
pre-registered to help control RDF. This will help increase levels of transparency and reliability 
of psychology of religion research. (2) Sample sizes should be outlined in advance of data 
collection and justified in the manuscript to help reduce the number of underpowered studies and 
increase the evidential value of the findings. (3) Type I error correction should be conducted 
where applicable. Authors should discuss their reasons for not doing so to help improve the 
transparency and reliability of research. We also recommend that all academic journals within 
the psychology of religion work to encourage these Open Science practices in some way, be it 
via a ‘badge’ system or by offering the ability to publish registered reports. We are happy to see 
that some journals have started to move in this direction and we are optimistic that others will do 
the same. We believe that, by applying these recommendations along with continued self-
reflection on better research practices, the psychology of religion will benefit from increased 
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Measures Modified .000** .000** .139 




Sample Size Justification .326 .033 .619 
Type I Correction .897* .806 .988 
Exact p-values .367 .152 .581 
Reporting of p >0.05 as meaningful .843* .730 .956 
Over-Inflation of Results .836* .725 .948 
Cut-Off Explained .533 .368 .697 
Non-RS Definition Consistency .341 .137 .545 
Unclear Coding Procedures .462 .288 .635 
   
Confidence intervals provided at the 95% level 
*   Indicates that there was a high level of agreement 
** Indicates that the values appeared below zero 
 
Table 2 
Codes and Final Percentages After Reconciliation 
Coding Categories Codes (Number, Percentage of Papers) 
Pre-Registered Yes (0, 0%); No (53, 100%) 
RS Defined Yes (45, 85%); No (7, 13%); NA (1, 2%) 
Clarity of RS Definition Clear (39, 73%); Vague (6, 11%); Mixed (3, 6%); No Definition 




RS Definition Matched 
Measure 
Yes, All (40, 75%); Mixed (10, 19%); No, All (2 4%); NA (1, 2%) 
RS Measure Rationale Yes (50, 94%); No (3, 6%) 
Measures Modified Yes, All (3, 6%); Yes, Some (14, 26%); No Changes (32, 60%); 
Created Measure (4, 8%) 
Exploratory or 
Confirmatory 
Exploratory (19, 36%); Confirmatory (25, 47%); Both (9, 17%) 
Sample Size Justification Yes (12, 23%); No (41, 77%) 
Type I Correction Yes (4, 8%); Did not mention (43, 81%); No, mentioned (1, 2%); 
Not applicable (5, 9%) 
Exact p-values Throughout (16, 30%); Varied (16, 30%); Did not provide (20, 
38%); NA (1, 2%) 
Reporting of p >0.05 as 
meaningful 
Yes (9, 17%); No (44, 83%) 
Over-Inflation of Results Yes (5, 9%); No (48, 91%) 
 
 
 
 
